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Corporate Governance Models: the Japanese
Experience in Context
Maria Lucia Passador*
Avoid the crowd. Do your own thinking independently.
Be the chess player, not the chess piece.
—Ralph Charell
INTRODUCTION: JAPANESE CORPORATE LAW AND ITS REFORM
This Article aims to assess the claim that three countries – Italy,
Japan and Portugal – present a tripartite,1 Latin, classic,2 and hybrid,3
model of corporate governance.
In general, Japanese law seems an “exotic variation of Roman-Ger-
manic models,” affected by United States legal models transplanted
after World War II, while at the same time, presenting original fea-
tures related to the history, evolution, and economic and social legacy
of both Buddhist and Confucian philosophies.4
* PhD Candidate in Legal Studies - Business and Social Law, Bocconi University Law
School, Milan, Italy; Visiting Researcher, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, U.S.A.
I am grateful to prof. Piergaetano Marchetti for his valuable, constant guidance and advice,
and to prof. Mark Roe for helpful comparative teachings and discussions.
1. This model can be renamed as “tripartite”, since it is characterized by (1) the general share-
holders’ meeting, (2) the board of directors, (3) and the board of auditors. It is also defined as
traditional or Latin although these adjectives are less effective, as observed in Giuseppe Bene-
detto Portale, La Corporate Governance delle Societa` Bancarie [The Corporate Governance of
Banking Companies], 61 RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETA` 48, 48–63 (2016) (It.)
2. Paolo Ferro-Luzzi, L’esercizio D’impresa tra Amministrazione e Controllo [The Exercise of
Company Management and Control], 12 ANALISI GIURIDICA DELL’ECONOMIA 231, 241 (2007)
(It.).
3. The empirical analysis, based on the sample of OECD countries, as well as Argentina,
Brazil, China, Hong Kong, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore, is mentioned both in Simone Alvaro et
al., Modelli di amministrazione e controllo nelle societa` quotate: Aspetti comparatistici e linee
evolutive [Corporate Governance Alternative Systems in Italian Listed Companies: Comparative
Aspects and Trends] 86 (May 9, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2630561 (It.) and Guido
Ferrarini, Professore Ordinario di Diritto Commerciale, Universita` degli Studi di Genova, Quali
modelli di amministrazione e controllo per le aziende italiane? [Which are the best Management
and Control Models for Italian Companies?] at the European House Ambrosetti L’Osservatorio
sull’eccellenza dei Sistemi di Governo in Italia - Workshop: Le aree di fontiera della corporate
governance (Nov. 17, 2015) (It.)).
4. Andrea Ortolani, Giappone (Diritto Moderno) [Japan (Modern Law)], in DIGESTO DELLE
DISCIPLINE PRIVATISTICHE SEZIONE CIVILE [DIGEST OF PRIVATE LAW DISCIPLINES CIVIL DIVI-
25
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In 1899, the Commercial Code was drafted and extensively drew
from the Allgemeines Deutsches Handelsgesetzbuch –  drafted in 1861.
Then, following World War II,5 numerous scandals, frauds, tensions,
and problems casted doubt on Japanese corporate governance and,
thus, led to several reforms in the Japanese economy in recent years.6
Important reform were influenced7 by Anglo-Saxon techniques, espe-
cially in 2002-2003, 2004 (regarding the Code of Corporate Govern-
ance), 2006 (the year in which the Corporate Law Reform was
elaborated)8 and, recently,9 in the 2014-2015 periods.10
SION] 435 (R. Sacco ed., 4th ed. 2011) (It.); Charles R. Stevens, Japanese Law and the Japanese
Legal System: Perspectives for the American Business Lawyer, 27 BUS. L.1259 (1972).
5. Takaya Seki & Thomas Clarke, The Evolution of Corporate Governance in Japan: The Con-
tinuing Relevance of Berle and Means, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 717, 722 (2014).
6. Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 351–82
(2001).
Since the burst of the economic “bubble” in the early 1990s, the situation in Japan has been
changing. The influence of main banks in corporate finance has declined, and sparked substantial
unwinding of stable cross-shareholdings since the mid-1990s.  Gregory Jackson, Toward a Com-
parative Perspective on Corporate Governance and Labour Management: Enterprise Coalitions
and National Trajectories 5, 18 (Research Inst. of Econ., Trade & Indus., RIETI Policy Discus-
sion Paper Series, Paper No. 04-E-023, 2005), http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/04e023
.pdf.  Cross-border mergers and acquisitions have also risen.  Japan reformed corporate govern-
ance rules several times and promoted the role of outside directors and company auditors, so
that its corporate governance gradually became more shareholder-oriented, notwithstanding the
fact that such changes provoked conflicts with employees.  Julen Esteban-Pretel et al., Changes
in Japan’s Labor Market Flows due to the Lost Decade 12 (Research Inst. of Econ., Trade &
Indus., RIETI Policy Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 11-E-039, 2011), http://www.rieti.go.jp/
jp/publications/dp/11e039.pdf; Jackson, supra note 6, at 19.
7. “The lack of universal solutions for management problems does not mean that countries
cannot learn from each other. Looking over de borders is one of the most effective ways of
getting ideas for management. But their application calls for prudence and judgment.”  Willem J.
L. Calkoen, The One-Tier Board in the Changing and Converging World of Corporate Govern-
ance: A Comparative Study of Boards in the UK, the US and the Netherlands 14 (Oct. 10, 2011)
(unpublished doctoral thesis, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam) (on file with Erasmus Univer-
siteit Rotterdam).
8. See mainly as to shareholder protections and national security concerns, Further Revision
of M&A Legislation is Needed, NIPPON KEIDANREN [JAPAN BUSINESS FEDERATION] (Dec. 12,
2006), https://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/2006/085.html; Reasonable Defense Measures
against Takeovers Detrimental to Corporate Value Are Needed, NIPPON KEIDANREN [JAPAN BUS-
INESS FEDERATION]  (Nov. 16, 2004), https://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/2004/085.html;
Kenichi Osugi, Transplanting Poison Pills in Foreign Soil: Japan’s Experiment, in TRANSFORM-
ING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN EAST ASIA 36 (Hideki Kanada et al. eds., 2008); Esteban-
Pretel et al., supra note 6, at 51; Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of
Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171 (2005).
9. In the meantime, in May 2012, the Research Institute of Economy Trade and Industry, one
of the leading Japanese policy think tanks, conducted comprehensive “questionnaire research
regarding corporate governance of Japanese companies.” Questionnaire on Corporate Govern-
ance of Japanese Companies, Research Inst. of Econ., Trade & Indus. (RIETI), http://www.rieti
.go.jp/jp/projects/research_activity/governance/data/survey_results.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
The results indicated the reality of the weak aspects of governance, including the compensation
of directors, the personnel affairs of representative directors, and the role of outside director. Id.
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Beginning in 2003, corporations could opt for different structures:11
(i) Gomei Gaisha (general partnerships); (ii) Goshi Gaisha (limited
partnerships); (iii) Yugen Gaisha (limited liability companies, accord-
ing to the model of the German GmbH, with more than 50 stakehold-
ers and minimum registered capital of 3 million Yen, divided into
stocks, managed by a Board of Directors (even if composed by sole
director) and with auditors); and (iv) Kabushiki Gaisha (joint-stock
companies, with a minimum share capital of 10 million Yen).  Japa-
nese corporate law experienced a far-reaching, substantial change, in-
tended to allow companies to opt for a system of governance “with
committees.”12  However, more than ten years after its introduction,
such models have not offer the desired results, as seen among one-tier
and two-tier models, such as in the Italian context.
The following year, conforming to international best practices,13 the
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) introduced “Principles of Corporate
Governance for Listed Companies,” revised in 2009, and again in
2015.  For corporations listed in the first and second segments of the
TSE, they are required to explain their decision not to apply these
principles.  For corporations listed in the JASDAQ Securities Ex-
10. In November 2013, the reform bill of the Japanese Companies Act was finally approved in
a Cabinet meeting and submitted to the ordinary Diet Session, therefore satisfying the requests
by institutional investors, who often criticized the weakness of corporate governance of listed
Japanese companies in relation to the fact that the number of outside directors is quite small
compared to listed companies in other developed countries. See ACGA Statement on Corporate
Governance Reform in Japan, ASIAN CORP. GOVERNANCE ASS’N (2009), http://www.acga-asia
.org/public/files/ACGA_Japan_Statement_2009_Dec15_English.pdf.
11. It is the first time for Japanese corporate law to permit companies to choose their govern-
ance system. The major reasons for reluctance of Japanese companies in choosing the new model
are (i) the resistance against independent directors’ strong power on the appointment of direc-
tors under the new model; (ii) the lack of resources of independent directors.
12. Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of Japa-
nese Corporate Governance, 53 AM. J. COMPANY L. 343 (2005). Any committee aims to enhance
the expertise of directors in a certain area and “to focus the responsibility for decisions in those
areas on a smaller number of people.” MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RE-
THINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 82 (1995). Regulatory
authorities required companies to introduce them. For instance, since 1978, the New York Stock
Exchange required audit committees with a majority of outside directors for listed companies.
Audit committees are responsible to assist board oversight on the integrity of financial state-
ments, the compliance of the corporation with both legal and regulatory requirements, and the
independent auditor’s qualification and independence.
13. External influences are also evident in the Japanese system, in SIMON LEARMOUNT, COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE: WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM JAPAN?; (2002); LUKE NOTTAGE ET AL.,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY: JAPAN’S GRADUAL TRANSFORMATION [IS
THIS A JOURNAL PUBLICATION? (2008); Christina L. Ahmadjian, Changing Japanese Corporate
Governance, 28 JAPANESE ECON. 59 (2000); Takaya Seki, Legal Reform and Shareholder Activ-
ism by Institutional Investors in Japan, 13 CORP. GOVERNANCE INT’L REV. 377 (2005).
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change, they are only required to provide reasons for not applying the
general principles contained therein.
In 2006, after multiple updates, the overall reform of the Compa-
nies Act (Law 26 July 2005, No. 86)14 took effect.  The Act was aimed
at substantially increasing competitiveness of Japanese companies in
terms of governance, compared to competitors,15 with particular at-
tention to groups of companies.16  While the first two structures re-
main unaffected, the Yugen Kaisha (similar to the GmbH) was
replaced by limited liability companies, similar to American limited
liability companies.17  The goal was to solve eventual problems be-
tween owners and directors of the business (Godo-Kaisha), and by
joint-stock companies, whose minimum share capital amounts to 1
Yen, either open or closed, due to the eventual transferability of
shares (Kabushiki Kaisha).
In 2007,18 new comprehensive reform developed in the field of
mergers, acquisitions, public offerings, and insider trading, mainly
through the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law; however, this
analysis does not fall within the present Article.  Still, in short, it con-
solidates the regulation of the financial market.
14. Tomotaka Fujita, Modernising Japanese Corporate Law: Ongoing Corporate Law Reform
in Japan, 16 SING. ACAD. L. J. 321 (2004); Eiji Takahashi & Madoka Shimizu, The Future of
Japanese Corporate Governance: The 2005 Reform, 19 J.  JAPANESE L. 35 (2005).
15. Takanobu Takehara & Takafumi Nihei, Corporate Governance Enters a New Era, 25 INT’L
FIN. L. REV. 44 (2006) (Takanobu Takehara and Takafumi Nihei of Nishimura & Partners out-
line how corporate governance will change when the Corporate Law comes into force.).
16. Eiji Takahashi, Japanese Corporate Groups under the New Legislation, 3 EUR. COMPANY
FIN. L. REV. 287 (2006); Gen Goto, The Outline for the Companies Act Reform in Japan and its
Implications, 35 J. JAPANESE L. 13 (2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=23
48554. Even if not considered by the reform the groups of companies doctrine and the responsi-
bility issues connected to them are, however, still a matter of debate, as proved by E. Takahashi
& T. Sakamoto, Japanese Corporate Law: Important Cases in 2010, 31 J. JAPANESE L. 249, 251
n.38 (2011).
17. Several authors address the topic of “Americanization” of Japanese company law. See,
e.g., Hiroshi Oda, The “Americanisation” of Japanese Corporate Law?–American Freedom, Jap-
anese Discipline, 69 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FU¨R AUSLA¨NDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVA-
TRECHT 47 (2005); R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Americanization of Japanese law,
23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 269 (2002). Some Authors claim that “[f]ull-scale ‘Americanisation
of Japanese law’ seems equally, if not more, implausible. Indeed, aspects of Japanese private law
may be undergoing a new round of ‘Europeanisation’ and more idiosyncratic globalization.”
NOTTAGE ET AL., supra note 13. Other authors compare the modus cogitandi between the two
contexts. See, e.g., Walter Gellhorn, Impressions of Japanese Legal Training, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
1239 (1958).  Whereas different authors, instead, analyze the degree of convergence between the
Japanese and Western legal systems, Dan W. Puchniak, The Japanization of American Corporate
Governance? Evidence of the Never-Ending History for Corporate Law, 9 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. &
POL’Y J. 7 (2007).
18. Robert Eberhart, Corporate Governance Systems and Firm Value: Empirical Evidence
from Japan’s Natural Experiment, 6 J. ASIA BUS. STUD. 176 (2012).
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In 2011, two major scandals with significant governance implica-
tions occurred in Japan.  First, firms were criticized for not having
boards capable of ferreting out and preventing unlawful behavior by
their top executives.  The Daio Paper scandal (Daioseishi Kabushiki
Gaisha) involved controlling shareholder looting, in which conflicts of
interest existed between minority shareholders and controlling share-
holders who were founding family members and, at the same time,
engaged in management.19  In contrast, the Olympus case is a “hy-
brid” management cover-up scandal, in which conflicts of interest ex-
isted between dispersed shareholders and managers who do not have
block shareholding.20
In May 2015, the Companies Act, Law 27 June 2014, No. 90, elabo-
rated within the Japan Revitalization Strategy, entered into force.21
Once again, it attested the attention of the legislator for corporate
governance issues, namely: (i) the need to appoint outside directors,22
19. The basic information of Daio Paper is available at Kelemen & Sibbitt, supra note 17. See
also Hideaki Miyajima, Faculty Fellow, Research Inst. of Econ., Trade & Indus. (REITI), Speech
at the RIETI Brown Bag Lunch Seminar: Orinpasu Daio Seishi jiken kara nihon no kigyo tochi
no shorai o kangaeru [Considering the Future of Corporate Governance in Japan: From the
Olympus and Daio Paper Scandals] 12 (Jan. 28, 2012) (the speaker underlines that this case
suggests the following issues: audit firm did not work; the absence of outside directors might
create governance issues of prime importance; monitoring subsidiary’s management by parent
company’s shareholders is essential).
20. See Miyajima, supra note 19, at 16. This case suggests the following issues: the practice of
appointing managers is widespread; independence and ability/specialty of outside directors are
essential; the function of audit firm is out of dispute and the role of capital market as a gate
keeper is extremely important. Disclosure of alleged M&A transactions were insufficient and,
therefore, market monitoring did not work.
21. It worth noting that political forces, such as the relative power of left versus right, account
for the differences in choice of corporate governance models among advanced industrial coun-
tries. Where social democracy is strong, shareholder rights are weak and shareholder diffusion is
low. Social democracy gives voice to claims on the firm in addition to those of the shareholders:
employee job security, income distribution, social welfare, social stability, and nationalism. To
counter these competing claims, block holders resist the diffusion of shares in order to maintain
leverage in the boardroom and investors shy away from a system in which they lack protection
or dominance. According to this, Japanese corporate governance and ownership fit in with the
way post-war Japan settled social conflicts. See MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT 93, 165 (2006).
22. In the sphere of company law, after the 2014 reform, a director is defined as “outside
director” if he neither now is and, in the previous ten years, was an executive officer (gy-
omushikko-torishimariyaku), a manager or an employee of the company (or any of its subsidiar-
ies), nor their spouses and relatives within the second degrees of affinity. Ex-bank directors, as
well as corporate executives and government officials often are a source of outside directors of
Japanese firms. On the one hand, ex-bank directors do not dominate corporate governance,
especially if the firm has fewer mortgageable assets and when it is in the services and finance
industry. On the other hand, corporate executives are mainly used then firms have a dominant
shareholder. Cf. Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Value of Prominent Directors: Corpo-
rate Governance and Bank Access in Transitional Japan, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 273 (2002); Steven
N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards: Determi-
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(ii) the promotion of board diversity, and therefore, the appointment
of women to hold managerial and executive positions, (iii) the intro-
duction of a joint-stock companies with audit committees, on which
this Article will focus.
“The role of law in Japan, which was largely overlooked in the tradi-
tional view of Japanese society, [gradually assumed] far greater impor-
tance due to significant changes. . . [occurred, as] the Meiji restoration
in the 19th century and the immediate post-World War II era. . . .
Nevertheless, the change is real.”23
In February 2014, the Japanese Financial Services Agency (FSA)
published the final version of the Stewardship Code, in order to im-
prove the average yield on long-term investments for customers and
beneficiaries.24
In June 2015, a major revision of the Code of Corporate Govern-
ance for Japanese companies occurred,25 which attempted to create a
sustainable governance development and increasing of the corporate
nants and Implications for Managers, 36 J. FIN. ECON. 225, 232 (1994). As to government offi-
cials, to some extent, they often obtain such position in the industry that their previous agencies
regulate, in order to informally influence such industry and to have informal connections with
their regulators, even if, as a matter of fact, they normally play a role only in the construction or
banking industry; to some other extent, they represent a form of collusion between the regulator
and banks that endangers the safety net mechanism in Japan. See id. at 226; Akiyoshi Horiuchi
& Katsutoshi Shimizu, Did Amakudari Undermine the Effectiveness of Regulator Monitoring in
Japan?, 25 J. BANKING  & FIN. 573 (2001). Needless to say, the restriction introduced by the
reform bill, increasing the standards for outside directors are expected to enhance the indepen-
dence of outside directors.
23. Bruce E. Aronson, Reconsidering the Importance of Law in Japanese Corporate Govern-
ance: Evidence from the Daiwa Bank Shareholder Derivative Case, 36 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 11,
56–57 (2003). For example, “it would surely be difficult today to find a Japanese executive who
felt comfortable focusing only on informal relationships and with his main bank, keiretsu, and
government ministry, while ignoring the formal legal duties of board members, derivative suits,
D&O insurance, lawyers, and compliance with law.” Id. at 57
24. See Principles for Responsible Institutional Investors: ‘Japan’s Stewardship Code’, FIN.
SERVS. AGENCY, THE JAPANESE GOV’T, http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/stewardship/2014
0407/01.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
25. TOKYO STOCK EXCH., JAPAN EXCH. GRP., JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: SEEKING
SUSTAINABLE CORPORATE GROWTH AND INCREASED CORPORATE VALUE OVER THE MID- TO
LONG-TERM (2015), http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/japan_cg_code_1jun15_en.pdf; see
also Press Release, Assonime, Circolare n. 31, Le novita` del Codice di autodisciplina 2015 per la
governance delle societa` quotate [Circular No. 31: The Novelties in the 2015 Corporate Govern-
ance Code for Governance of Listed Companies] (Nov. 6, 2015) (It.), http://www.assonime.it/
AssonimeWeb2/dettaglio.jsp?id=262032&idTipologiaDettaglio=451 (The next version of the
document is expected to be published in July 2017, then, every two years.); Piergaetano
Marchetti, Professor Emeritus, Bocconi Univ., Speech at the European House – Ambrosetti
Workshop: Le Aree di Frontiera della Corporate Governance L’Osservatorio sull’Eccellenza dei
Sistemi di Governo in Italia [The Border Areas of Corporate Governance. Observatory on Ex-
cellence in Systems of Government in Italy] (Nov. 17, 2015) (It.) (Speech is titled Alcune novita`
introdotte nell’ultima revisione del Codice di Autodisciplina [Some New Features Introduced in
the Latest Revision of the Code: the Whistleblowing and Succession Plans]).
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value in the long run.  This revision is perfectly integrated in the ar-
ticulated renewal of the entire discipline.  The Code intended to: (i)
affect the gradual decision-making process of companies, (ii) stimulate
entrepreneurship,26 (iii) promote sustainable growth, (iv) focus on the
rights of shareholders and on the equal treatment among them, and
(v) enhance proper cooperation amongst stakeholders through trans-
parency in communications, responsibilities within the Board and en-
gagement of shareholders.
As to governance, articulated in Principle 4 of the Code of Corpo-
rate Governance, it worth noting that the Code does not express opin-
ions or preferences on the use of one specific governance model.  On
the contrary, it formulates the basic governance elements in the
broadest and most inclusive way.
The board appoints and removes the management, sets fees, de-
cides business strategies, evaluates the adequacy of the risks assumed
by the senior management, verifies and effectively supervises the deci-
sions of the management body, takes an outside perspective in terms
of social information, also with regard to non-financial information.
Under Principle 4.8, the Code hopes that listed companies appoint at
least two independent directors and that, optionally, at least one third
of the directors are independent, and under Principle 4.9, it also hopes
that compliance with Principle 4.8 is in harmony with the standards of
independence set by the National Stock Exchange; the aim is that
both outside and independent directors are efficiently used27 and de-
26. Horiuchi & Shimizu, supra note 22.
27. TOKYO STOCK EXCH., supra note 25, at 21-22. Notwithstanding the fact that there is no
established definition of “independent directors” and “the definition of independent varies
somewhat depending on who is advocating this reform” Id., a director is considered to be “inde-
pendent” if there is no evidence of conflict of interest, of material, financial or relationship of
any kind with the company, with its executives, with other members of the Board of Directors,
with shareholders holding at least 10% of the voting capital, or with main banks. Moreover, in
case of cross-shareholdings, affiliated parties to such agreements will also be considered “non
independent.”The Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) Securities Listing Regulation now requires issu-
ers to appoint at least one independent director and to report on his/her status, revealing if: (i)
he/she is (or ever was) an executive of the parent company or subsidiary; (ii) he/she receives
substantial monetary benefits from the company for his/her professional services, in addition to
remuneration for the position in the board of directors; (iii) it holds significant stakes in the
company; or (iv) it is bound by personal relationships to executives, affiliates, major sharehold-
ers or professional service providers. See Securities Listing Regulation, Reg. No. 1 – 826 of 2016
(Japan), http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/rules-participants/rules/regulations/tvdivq0000001vyt-att/se-
curities_listing_regulations_(r1-r826)_20161104.pdf. According to the regulation, the directors
who possess such a relationship may still be qualified as independent members by the company,
in case the corporation provides explanations on their independence and objectivity.Japan cer-
tainly registered a significant delay in the appointment of independent directors, which is partly
due to the corporate culture that characterizes it and partly due to the absence of proxy fights, at
least for a long period of time. Chien-Chung Lin, The Japanese Independent Director Mechanism
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rive considerable benefits from their roles and responsibilities, as as-
sessments of appointment and removal of senior management,
conflicts of interest and minority shareholders.
A REFORM WITHIN A REFORM: OUTSIDE DIRECTORS IN JAPAN
There has been growing pressure, both domestically and interna-
tionally, on Japanese companies to introduce the outside directors.28
As for criticism from abroad, foreign institutional investors, such in-
vestment trusts and pension funds, propose the implementation of an
outside director system and cast ballots against appointing directors
who are not dependent on management of the company.29  In 2008,
the Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA) stated that:
Revisited: The Corporate Law Settings, Current Status, and Its Explanations, 24 TEMPLE INT’L &
COMP. L. J. 65, 100 (2010). In 2010, only 48.2% of companies listed in the first section of the
Tokyo Stock Exchange presented outside directors, but, according to the evaluations conducted
by the Tokyo-based Japan Association of Corporate Directors (JACD), in 2014, the number rose
to 74.4%. Survey on Corporate Governance of Listed Corporations 2014, JAPAN ASSOC. OF
CORP. DIRS. 4, http://www.jacd.jp/en/resources/cgreport_e.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).compar-
ing the Japanese and Italian situation, the importance of independence requirements appears a
matter of prime interest in both systems: under Art. 148, section 4-ter, of the Consolidated Law
on Finance, the criteria of independence required by Art. 148, section 3, are only applied to
committee members, showing a sharp difference from art. 2399 of the Italian Civil Code. L. 28
December 2005, n. 262/2005 (It.); cf. CODE CIVIL [C.c.] art. 2399 (It.). In addition, Art. 154 of the
Consolidated Law on Finance provides that the members of the Committee shall not apply Art.
2399, which may continue to be relevant to the notion of an “independent”, but not of “indepen-
dent eligible to be a member of the Committee”, to which the requirements mentioned in Art.
148, section 3, of the Consolidated Law on Finance are essential. D.Lgs. 6 February 2004, n. 37/
2004 (It.).  As to the independence requirements, rules are consistent with the ones related to
the board of auditors. TOMMASO DI MARCELLO, SISTEMA MONISTICO E ORGANIZZAZIONE DELLE
SOCIETA` DI CAPITALI [ONE-TIER SYSTEM AND ORGANIZATION OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPA-
NIES] 241 (2013) (It.).The complex issue of determining the concept of independence, given its
diverse definitions, however, could be simplified by eliminating the regulations of that require-
ment contained in the Civil Code, thus, restoring a system in which the independence is regu-
lated by corporate governance codes only, as suggested by Massimo Belcredi & Lorenzo Caprio,
Amministratori di minoranza e amministratori indipendenti: stato dell’arte e proposte evolutive
[Directors Appointed by Minority Shareholders and Independent Directors: State of the Art and
Evolutionary Perspectives], in ATTI DEI SEMINARI CELEBRATIVI PER I 40 ANNI DALL’ISTITUZIONE
DELLA COMMISSIONE NAZIONALE PER LE SOCIETA` E LA BORSA [ACTS OF CELEBRATORY SEMI-
NARS FOR 40 YEARS BY THE INSTITUTION OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR COMPANIES AND
STOCK EXCHANGE] 19, 47, 49 chart 2 (G. Mollo ed. 2015), http://www.consob.it/documents/
11973/201676/qg9.pdf/89cb69a2-8e15-40c7-8fc6-168eeb012a5b.
28. See TOKYO STOCK EXCH., JAPAN EXCH. GRP., TOSHO JOJOGAISHA NO KOPORETO
GABANANSU NIKANSURU TOSHIKAMUKE IKENBOSHU NITAISHITE YOSERARETA IKEN NO GAIYB
NITSUITE [OPINION SUMMARIES RECEIVED FROM INVESTORS IN RESPONSE TO LISTED COMPANY
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR INVESTOR] (2008), http://www.jpx.co.jp/en-
glish/equities/improvements/general/tvdivq0000004iib-att/opinions_summary.pdf.
29. Shinya Miwa, Nihon Kigyb no Shagai Torishimariyaku to Kigyo Gyoseki no Kankei Ni
Kansuru Jissho Bunseki [An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship between Outside Directors
and Japanese Firms ‘Long-Term Performance], 25 Nihon Keiei Gakkaishi [Journal of Business
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[t]here should be a transparent process of independent, external su-
pervision of management on behalf of all shareholders. We recom-
mend that all companies, even those with traditional board
structures, make a commitment to appoint a minimum of three in-
dependent external directors as soon as practicable. Over the me-
dium term, such directors should ideally comprise a third of the
board. Over the longer term, we recommend that they comprise one
half of the board. These ratios are based upon practical experience
in other developed markets regarding the minimum number of in-
dependent directors required for the effective functioning of
boards.30
Urged by the both domestic and international pressure, a study on
independent directors and auditors was conduced in 2009.31  The
movement pushed for the TSE to amend its rules in December 2009.
In 2011, the Ministry of Justice issued the following three proposals
regarding obligations to appoint outside directors: (a) Companies with
a Board of Auditors, limited to Public Companies that are also Large
Companies, are obligated to appoint one or more outside directors;
(b) Companies that are required to submit annual securities reports
pursuant to the provisions of Article 24(1) of the Financial Instru-
ments and Exchange Act are obligated to appoint one or more outside
directors; (c) no changes will be made to the rules under current law.32
It is still unclear whether the Ministry of Justice wished to formally
require all firms to appoint outside directors.
Many agreed with the second proposal, companies required to sub-
mit securities reports have outside directors, including: the ACGA,
TSE, Japan Corporate Auditors Association, the Japan Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, the Japan Corporate Governance Net-
work, the Japan Association of Corporate Directors, the Japan Feder-
ation of Bar Associations, and the American Chamber of Commerce
in Japan.33 However, the Japan Association of Corporate Executives
and the Japan Business Federation agreed with the third proposal that
Management] [N.K.G.] 15 (2010), http://ci.nii.ac.jp/els/110007618882.pdf?id=ART0009436547&
type=pdf&lang=en&host=cinii&order_no=&ppv_type=0&lang_sw=&no=1483243671&cp=.
30. White Paper on Corporate Governance in Japan, ASIAN CORP. GOVERNANCE ASS’N HONG
KONG (2008), http://www.acga-asia.org/public/files/Japan%20WP_%20May2008.pdf.
31. Corporate Governance Study Group, The Corporate Governance Study Group Report,
MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE & IND., http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/downloadfiles/
200906cgst.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2017); Financial System Council’s Study Group, Report by the
Financial System Council’s Study Group on the Internationalization of Japanese Financial and
Capital Markets: Toward Stronger Corporate Governance of Publicly Listed Companies, FIN.
SERVICES AGENCY, http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/news/2009/20090618-1/01.pdf (last visited Feb. 5,
2017).
32. See generally, Goto, supra note 16.
33. See id.
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no changes be made.34  Industry players remain cautious about the
change, on the grounds that such systems might erode management
autonomy.
Regarding requirements for outside directors and outside company
auditors, two proposals were suggested: (a) additional requirements
for outside directors and outside company auditors, such as they may
not be a director or executive officer, employee of a parent company,
spouse, relative of a director, or other employee of the company; and
(b) no changes will be made to the rules under current law.35  The
ACGA, TSE, Japan Corporate Auditors Association, the Japan Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants, the Japan Corporate Govern-
ance Network, the Japan Association of Corporate Directors, the
Japan Federation of Bar Associations, and the American Chamber of
Commerce in Japan agree with the first proposal, while the Japan As-
sociation of Corporate Executives and the Japan Business Federation
thought that no changes should be made.  The standoff continues be-
tween proponents and opponents of mandatory outside directors.
Proponents of mandatory outside directors argued both the com-
pany’s specific background and Japan’s corporate culture and corpo-
rate governance system caused the two scandals, while opponents of
mandatory outside directors insist that the current corporate govern-
ance rule in Japan is operating sufficiently.36
It appears that both sides have extreme views, so it is necessary to
consider the issue in a well-balanced manner, which this Article will
address.
[T]o promote effective measures by focusing on not only formality
but also substance to enhance corporate governance. In fact, some
companies are substantively working to improve governance by
means of their own unique measured, beyond the regulatory re-
quirements. . . . To impose formalistic rules mandating even such
companies to have outside directors in a uniform manner would
have the contrary effect of hampering the formation of the most
appropriate governance structure, even from the viewpoint of mi-
nority shareholders and investors.37
It is essential to point out that many investors criticized the fact that
companies with a board of directors are not required to appoint
outside directors.  While outlining and examining the Reform Bill, in a
short period of time, outside directors were mandatory.  Instead the




37. Corporate Governance Study Group, supra note 31.
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“comply-or-explain” approach, borrowed from the principles con-
tained in the Codes of Corporate Governance.38
In addition, it worth noting that, in 2013, Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS) generally recommended against voting in favor of the
appointment of representative of directors, whose company does not
have any outside director, or nominees, at an annual shareholder
meeting.39
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
As previously mentioned, among the types of joint-stock companies
(Kabushiki-Kaisha, KK), three main structures are particularly rele-
vant, depending on the specific model of governance used.
The Tripartite Model
The “tripartite” model (kansayaku-kai setchi kisha, Art. 2, tenth
paragraph, of the Companies Act), is formed by the Board of Direc-
tors. It is a monitoring body similar to the Board of Auditors: the au-
diting firm/external auditor.40  The admirable trait of evolution that
this model showed is reducing the large number of directors that made
up the board only a few decades ago.41  It decreased from an average
of 30 - 40 directors to an average of 7.5 directors.42  Moreover, while it
38. Goto, supra note 16, at 22.
39. 2013 Japan Proxy Voting Summary Guidelines, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVICES, INC.
9 https://www.issgovernance.com/file/2013-policies/2013ISSJapanGuidelinesSummaryRev0131
2013.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
40. See the definition contained in the Huı`she` faˇ [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 2,
para. x, http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2035&vm=04&re=02 (Japan)
(“‘Company with Board of Auditors’ means any Stock Company which has a Board of Auditors,
or any Stock Company which is required to have a Board of Auditors under the provisions of
this Act.”).
41. TOKYO STOCK EXCH., JAPAN EXCH. GRP., TSE-LISTED COMPANIES WHITE PAPER ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 19 (2015), http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/news/1020/20150625-01.html.
42. Id. Such a dimension is consistent with the argument that the position of director works as
an incentive for employees because it is better to have more seats in order to provide employees
with incentives. See Michael Gibson, “Big Bang” Deregulation and Japanese Corporate Govern-
ance: A Survey of the Issues, (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Paper No. 624, 1998),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=133552. However, it would be difficult to
have efficient discussion in the boardroom among such a wide number of directors. Since the
typical Japanese large-sized board inhibits effective discussion, Sir Walter Puckey, writing on
board size, tells that, in his experience, “the most effective size for first-class participation and
decision making is between six and eight excluding the chairman and the secretary . . . .Too many
board meetings display verbosity among a few and almost complete silence from the rest.”
ADRIAN CADBURY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CHAIRMANSHIP: A PERSONAL VIEW 51–52
(2002). Similarly, Lipton and Lorsch believe the maximum size shall not exceed ten directors.
Martin Lipton & Jay Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance, 48 BUS.
L. 59, 67–68 (1992). In large listed companies, board meetings are often caricaturized as a cere-
mony where no substantial discussion is held. Instead, there are more substantial – even though
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is not necessary directors are classified as outside directors, at least
half of the auditors should be defined as outside corporate auditors
(Art. 335, third paragraph, of the Companies Act).  Despite the fact
that the expression kansayaku-kai represents the perfect translation of
the German Aufsichtsrat,43 the auditors have no function of the ap-
pointment or removal of directors, as the latter are elected and ap-
pointed by a majority of shareholders at the general meeting (Art. 329
and 339).  The auditors are elected at the general shareholders’ meet-
ing, so they are similar to a traditional supervisory board.44  Auditors
participating in Board meetings without voting rights (Art. 383, first
paragraph) are also in charge of monitoring the tasks of directors, not
just limited to accounting issues (Art. 381, first paragraph).
The Quasi One-Tier Model
The “quasi one-tier model” (i’in-kai setchi kaisha, Art. 2, twelfth
paragraph, of the Companies Act),45 is formed by the Board and con-
sists of three committees –  nomination, remuneration and audit46 –
with functions indicated under Art. 404, paragraphs one, two, and
three, respectively.  The members must be mainly outside directors
and independent auditors, according to Art. 400, paragraphs one and
three.47 The peculiarities of such a system consist in the fact that direc-
tors are not involved, or, at least not exclusively involved, as stated in
informal – meetings, often called “Jomu-kai” or “Keiei-iinnkai”, which refers to a council con-
sisting of only part of the members of the entire board of directors who have the real power to
decide, held before a board official meeting in order to discuss agendas to be proposed to the
board meeting itself. On the one hand, they have a positive impact, since it is practically difficult
to hold a board meeting in order to decide urgent cases; on the other hand, their existence makes
the legal requirements (as keeping records) of formal meetings relatively meaningless.
43. Goto, supra note 16, at 18.
44. Chien-Chung Lin, The Japanese Independent Director Mechanism Revisited: The Corpo-
rate Law Settings, Current Status, and Its Explanations, 24 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L. J. 65, 87
chart 87 (2010).
45. See Huı`she` faˇ [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 2, para. xii, http://www.japanese-
lawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2035&vm=04&re=02 (“‘Company with Committees’ means
any Stock Company which has a nominating committee, an audit committee and a compensation
committee (hereinafter referred to as ‘Committees’).).
46. In Japan, the remuneration essentially consists of a fixed amount, while in some infrequent
cases only a proportionate remuneration to performances is preferred. Listed companies must
indicate both the total remuneration of their directors and its division. If directors are granted
stock options, the company must communicate a description of their terms and conditions, as
well as the number of directors to whom such stocks are attributed. Should outside directors
exist, such communications should be separated and differentiated among directors directly and
indirectly involved in the management and the amount of remuneration for each director should
be detailed by type of payment – salary, bonus, stock options, etc. – if his/her salary annually
exceeds ¥ 100 million.
47. Although Japanese laws and regulations do not require a defined number of independent
directors, the most influential proxy advisors, Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC, believe that corpora-
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Art. 402, paragraph six, in the current management,48 led by managers
who identify themselves shikkoˆ-yaku.  The audit committee performs
tasks of control, related to the ones carried out by the supervisory
board in the traditional model, such as preparing reports and propos-
ing decisions on the appointment and removal of auditors to be
presented at the general shareholders’ meeting.49
The Newest Model
The newest model was recently introduced model under Law 27
June 2014, No. 90. This model established a board of directors and an
audit committee.  The audit committee replaces the supervisory
board, which is mainly composed of outside directors.50  Their func-
tions include control and business supervision and overseeing the au-
diting firm/external auditor.
THE TRADITIONAL MODEL
Among the companies listed on the TSE, the vast majority, 2756 out
of 3515 companies, or 78.41%,51 adopted the “tripartite” model, with
kansayaku-kai.  This trend appears to be decreasing since first edition
of the Report on Corporate Governance, issued in 2007.
A closer look at the concentration of the traditional model leads us
to consider the Shiseido example.  It is expected that at the sharehold-
ers’ meeting, there will integration between the board of directors, the
board of auditors, and the auditing company/external auditor.
The general shareholders meeting takes place at least once in the
first three months of each year. A meeting may also convene in a spe-
cial session, if necessary, by the legal representative (Daihyoutor-
ishimariyaku), who assumes the role of the President in that case.
Key documents related to shareholders’ decisions are disclosed via the
tions that adopted the model with three committees and with the audit committee shall present
at least one third of independent directors within their Boards
48. Huı`she` faˇ [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 415, http://www.japaneselawtransla-
tion.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2035&vm=04&re=02 (“‘Directors of a Company with Committees may
not execute the operations of the Company with Committees unless otherwise provided in this
act or any order under this Act.”).
49. Lin, supra note 44, at 91 chart 3.
50. Id.
51. Search for Corporate Governance Information, JAPAN EXCH.GRP., http://www2.tse.or.jp/
tseHpFront/CGK020010Action.do?Show=Show (Under the “Organization Structure / Capital
Structure” heading, click on organization type drop down menu and select “Company with a
corporate auditor system.”  Then scroll down and click the button “Number of hits.”).
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Internet, together with the financial statements with the report of the
auditing firm, carried out by external and statutory auditors.52
The majority of the present shareholders entitled to vote, unless
particularly high quorum are required,53 may decide if: (i) at least one
third of the voting shareholders are entitled to vote, or (ii) at least
two-thirds of the voting shareholders present.  Proxy voting rights is
allowed and the announcement of the final vote is required.
Under Shiseido’s corporate documents, the board of directors, com-
posed by no more than twelve members, according to the bylaws, is
appointed by the shareholders’ meeting, with the favorable vote of
more than one third of shareholders voting rights, without using the
list voting mechanism, thus injecting an element of proportionality in
the election of directors, allowing “minority” shareholders to appoint
some of them.54
The term of each director is twelve months long, ending when the
ordinary general meeting of shareholders is called to approve the fi-
nancial statements of the term year.55  Practically speaking, the board
is far less nourished than bylaws dictate: it consists of six members,
half of whom are independent.56  The Board is responsible for decid-
ing on matters which are relevant to the life of the company, such as
the acquisition of major assets, intake of large debts, appointment or
dismissal of employees of relief, establishment of branches and sub-
units, as well as, articulation of the internal control systems.57 The re-
muneration of directors must be determined by resolution of share-
holders at the general meeting, not the Board.58
The Supervisory Board, composed of at least three members, half of
whom must be outsiders, is elected by the majority of shareholders,
with the favorable vote of more than one third of the entire share
capital possessing voting rights.59  The Supervisory Board is appointed
for a four-year term,60 with a substitution mechanism, whereby the
members who replace retired auditors must continue their tasks until
52. Statutory auditors check the legality of the judgment or performance of directors, not
their appropriateness, which should be settled ultimately as a form of personnel affair.
53. Huı`she` faˇ [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 309, http://www.japaneselawtransla
tion.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2035&vm=04&re=02.
54. See generally Corporate Governance, SHISEIDO GRP., http://www.shiseidogroup.com/com-
pany/governance/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).





60. Closed corporations can, however, extend the duration of their terms, for a maximum
period of ten years.
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the expiry of their original term of office.61 The remuneration of audi-
tors shall be determined by shareholder resolution at the general
meeting.62
The majority of the companies follows the traditional system, where
the system of checks and balances is guaranteed by: (i) an effective
separation of the duties of supervision and management; (ii) the pres-
ence of at least one independent director, capable of promoting a
more effective management control; and (iii) a reduction of the period
in which directors are in charge of a specific role.
Following the adoption of the Corporate Governance Code, compa-
nies that do not have outside directors are required to explain the
reasons why they preferred such a solution.63  This model does not
fully meet the needs of businesses, in the following ways: the lack of
business knowledge of independent directors; evidence of a prefer-
ence for a system of governance based on checks and balances among
directors; declaring that the appointment of individuals with former
working experiences in financial institutions do not meet the criteria
that distinguish outside directors.  The company is still able to take an
outside perspective into account. The absence of outside directors
might be justified by external advisory bodies - committees composed
by third parties - capable of expressing opinions on remuneration and
compliance issues.
THE THREE COMMITTEES MODEL
The model “with committees” represents a compromise proposal.64
It takes into consideration the original intentions of the Ministry,
which sought to replace the Board of Auditors with committees within
the Board of Directors, while requiring the presence of at least one
outside director, and on the one hand, the needs of system opera-
tors,65 which expressed themselves in a different way.
This model, widespread among blue chip corporations, is utilized by
foreign institutional investors,66 such as Sony67 and Nomura. This
61. See Corporate Governance, supra note 54.
62. See id.
63. TOKYO STOCK EXCH., supra note 25, at 31 (Summarizing and implementing national legis-
lation on the topic of corporate governance).
64. K. EGASHIRA, KETSUGO KIGYO HO NO RIPPO TO KAISHAKU [LEGISLATION AND INTER-
PRETATION OF THE CONGLOMERATE LAW] 197 (1995).
65. Gilson & Milhaupt, supra note 12, at 353-54.
66. The dynamism that these institutional investors require corresponds to one of the major
reasons that led to the development of the governance of the country. See Michael A. Witt,
Japan Coordinated Capitalism between Institutional Change and Structural Inertia (INSEAD,
Paper No. 2012/105/EPS, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2171236;
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model was adopted by 62 companies between April and October
2003,68 the number continued to increased so that, in October 2014,
5.6% of Japanese listed corporations used that that model,69 which
clearly separates supervision and operative business.
A major example of this model is Sony Corporation,70 a company
governed by a board of directors elected at the annual meeting of
shareholders, organized into three committees – nomination, remu-
neration and audit –  each of them consisting of three or more direc-
tors, the majority of whom are outside directors.
Under this model, the Board, composed of ten to twenty members,
determines the basic management policies, oversees key operations,
appoints and dismisses the members of the committees, as well as the
CEO who supervises management within the limits of his powers.
Sony’s bylaws: (i) provides for the separation of the role of President
of the Board and the CEO;71 (ii) temporally circumscribes the roles of
Michiyo Nakamoto & Kate Burgess, Dividends to Reap: Shareholder Activists Begin to Make
Their Mark in Japan, FIN. TIMES (July 2, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/be842ae4-4863-11dd-
a851-000077b07658.
67. In order to separate monitoring and operational functions of the Board, in 1997, Sony
introduced a system of non-statutory executive officers (shikko-yakuin) and nearly half of Japa-
nese companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange followed it. Directors responsible for divi-
sional operation stepped down from the Board and got the new title of “shikko-yakmn”, while
the remaining directors focused on business strategies and monitoring roles. The number of di-
rectors began to be reduced simultaneously. Seki, supra note 13, at 380. As for the United States
firms, a smaller board is related to better firm performance, see David Yermack, Higher Market
Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185, 209 (1996).
68. In May 2003, thirty-two companies (nineteen of them belong to the Hitachi group) an-
nounced their intention to move to the newly-created system, in the same year, as reported in
Hiroyuki Yanai, 009: The Systematization of Ethical Virtue - The Position of Japan’s “Companies
with Committees” System, RESEARCH INST. OF ECON., TRADE & INDUS. (REITI) (June 6 2003),
http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/projects/cgj/columns/009.html.
69. Goto, supra note 16, at 18. However, despite not many companies adopting such model,
its introduction resulted in positive findings in multiple aspects: the increase in the number of
outside directors among the companies characterized by the traditional model, and in the num-
ber of independent directors having no conflicts of interest with investors pursuant to Rules 22,
fourth paragraph, fifth point, 436-2 and 445-4 of the TSE Securities Listing Regulation, accord-
ing to which the company is required to set out the reasons why it intended to appoint them.
These trends are also confirmed in the latest version of the TOKYO STOCK EXCH., Japan Exch.
Grp. TSE-Listed Companies White Paper on Corporate Governance 21 charts 26, 27, & 28
(2015), http://www.jpx.co.jp/english/news/1020/20150625-01.html.
70. For a historical-quantitative analysis of the corporation, a pioneer in the field of institu-
tional change, see Toru Yoshikawa et al., Corporate Governance Reform as Institutional Innova-
tion: The Case of Japan, 18 ORG. SCI. 973 (2007) and, as to Sony, see Luke R. Nottage & Leon T.
Wolff, Corporate Governance and Law Reform in Japan: From the Lost Decade to the End of
History? 13-14 (Comparative Research in Law and Political Economy, Paper. No. 3/2005, 2005),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=830005.
71. See generally Corporate Governance, SONY CORP., https://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/csr_re
port/governance/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).  For what concerns the “with committees” model, the
Companies Act explicitly requires, pursuant to art. 402 and 420, that at least one of them is
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outside directors; (iii) nominates one of them as the President of each
committee; (iv) announces the experience of directors in order to
eliminate eventual conflicts of interest and to ensure independence in
decision-making; (v) requires that at least one member of the nomina-
tion audit committees be a CEO; (vi) discourages the participation of
members of the audit committee in multiple committees; and (vii)
prohibits the CEO of the group to participate in the compensation
committee.
The Nomination Committee proposes the appointment and re-
moval of directors to be approved at the general meeting of share-
holders, and evaluates the plans of management turnover.
The Remuneration Committee focuses its attention on individual
compensation of directors, CEOs, and executive directors.
The Audit Committee monitors the performance of directors; it
oversees and evaluates the work conducted by the auditing company
as to the appointment, removal, approval, or non-confirmation of the
fee; evaluates the adequacy of the internal audit in relation to the re-
sults and financial reporting.
Overall, in the fiscal year that ended on March 31, 2015, the Board
of Directors met ten times, with all directors participated at each ses-
sion, with one only exception.72 The Nomination Committee met five
times, while the Remuneration Committee met nine times. All com-
mittee members took part in each session.
Compared to the traditional model, the committee system makes
decisions in a more expeditious way, with greater transparency in the
management.  Companies adopting it took advantage of the effective
separation that this system allows between oversight and business exe-
cution, due to the flexible delegating methods and to the strengthened
controlling functions that it implements.
Nevertheless, empirical studies73 show that the effectiveness of such
a model markedly depends on outside directors. In other words,
nominated as executive officer (shikkoyaku) and one of them as a legal representative. Huı`she` faˇ
[Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 402, art. 420, http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/
law/detail/?id=2035&vm=04&re=02.
72. See Sony, supra note 71.
73. Peter Lawley, Panacea or Placebo? An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of the Japanese
Committee System Corporate Governance Law Reform, 9 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 105, 139
(2007)
There is also no strong evidence that the committee system provides companies with the capabil-
ities to perform well in specific industries, or that the committee system’s positive image contrib-
utes to higher market valuation. The solution, however, is not further reform of the committee
system law. . . . The committee system is not a panacea for all corporate governance and corpo-
rate performance woes. That much is evident from the many poor-performing companies that
have adopted the committee system. The committee system does, however, resemble a placebo.
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greater efficiency may be achieved by pointing out the distinguishing
features of the role of outsiders and preventing them from covering
multiple executive positions, rather than through additional legislative
reforms.74
After the 2014 Reform and the introduction of the model “with the
audit committee,” the model “with committees” suffered a marked
decline of -3.7%. Currently this model utilized by only 69 listed com-
panies out of 3515 or 1.96%.75  This structure was used in a minor
number of corporations, since there is a widespread custom whereby
employees tend to think that their final goal is to become a director
through internal promotion, and thus, accordingly, most of the board
members are inside directors.76
THE AUDIT COMMITTEE MODEL
The most recent reform, affecting the above-outlined concept of
outside directors77 and linking the content of the Companies Act and
the British Combined Code, created a variation from the previous
model.  In this sense, the legislator implemented the model with an
“audit and supervisory” committee, composed of at least two outside
directors, is already known in the United States.  This model enables
the company to make decisions quickly, and it enables outside direc-
tors to concentrate on fulfilling their originally expected roles. Thus,
the newly introduced option eliminates the burden of employing
outside statutory auditors and two committees, in exchange for requir-
ing outside directors.
From a formal perspective, it should be noted that its functioning is
specified in the bylaws, whereas, in the British system, the details re-
It is perceived to be a stronger and more transparent corporate governance system, even though
the empirical data suggests that in practice it is generally neither stronger nor more transparent
than the statutory auditor system.
74. See id.
75. Search for Corporate Governance Information, JAPAN EXCH.GRP., http://www2.tse.or.jp/
tseHpFront/CGK020010Action.do?Show=Show (Under the “Organization Structure / Capital
Structure” heading, click on organization type drop down menu and select “Company with three
committees.”  Then scroll down and click the button “Number of hits.”).
76. Japan is often considered an employee-oriented or “the company community”-oriented
country. See Zenichi Shishido, Reform in Japanese Corporate Law and Corporate Governance:
Current Changes in Historical Perspective, 49 AM. J. COMPANY LAW 653, 654, 659 (2001).
77. Lawley, supra note 73, at 114, 117; Goto, supra note 16, at 21 n.52 (A prominent company,
Toyota, whose governance has always been a reference model for all Japanese companies, ac-
knowledges the significance of that role.).
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lated to it are contained in the Terms of Reference, as provided under
Article C.3.2 of the latest version of the Combined Code.78
This model was adopted by Yahoo Japan Corporation, as well as,
691 out of 3515 other listed companies, or 19.63%.79  It aims at
strengthening the corporate governance by reinforcing the monitoring
role of the board.  Yahoo proposed a transition towards the model
“with audit committee” that is asked to issue opinions regarding the
appointment, removal, replacement, remuneration of directors during
the meetings, thus, partially replacing the nomination committee.
Art. 4 (Organizations) of the bylaws states the existence of the Au-
dit and Supervisory Committee, substituting the combination Corpo-
rate Auditors - Board of Corporate Auditors: it advises the Board of
Directors, primarily in charge of audit and CEO evaluation, and the
auditing company/external auditor.
The board of directors is now composed by no more than fifteen
members, including a maximum of five members, who may be also
part of the audit committee.
A distinction is made between the ones who belong to the Commit-
tee and the ones who are not part of it.  As to the appointment, the
members of the audit committee are elected by proposal of the Board,
and assessed by their contribution in terms of corporate governance
and audit. The audit committee serves a two-year term, while the
other board members only serve for one year,80 as to the mechanisms
of substitution81 and as to the remuneration.82
78. FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE 18 (Apr. 2016),
https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/UK-Corporate-Govern-
ance-Code-April-2016.pdf; see generally Management Policy: Corporate Governance, YAHOO
JAPAN CORP., http://ir.yahoo.co.jp/en/policy/governance.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2017).
79. Search for Corporate Governance Information, JAPAN EXCH.GRP., http://www2.tse.or.jp/
tseHpFront/CGK020010Action.do?Show=Show (Under the “Organization Structure / Capital
Structure” heading, click on organization type drop down menu and select “Company with audit
etc. committee”  Then scroll down and click the button “Number of hits.”).
80. It can be criticized that, unlike statutory auditors appointed for four years, term of office
of members of an audit committee is only one year is an ineffective guarantee of status, which
could cause them to have difficulty in pointing out the problems at their companies. See gener-
ally Management Policy: Corporate Governance, supra note 78.
81. YAHOO JAPAN CORP., NOTIFICATION OF PARTIAL REVISION TO THE ARTICLES OF INCOR-
PORATION 3 (2015), https://s.yimg.jp/images/docs/ir/release/2015/en20150521_4.pdf. In the event
that a director should be substituted because of his/her retirement, the number of directors
should be increased within the statutory limits, the substitute will replace him/her until all direc-
tors remain in office (Art. 21, third paragraph); if such director is, instead, a member of the
Committee, the substitute will replace him/her for the remaining time in which the substituted
should have operated (Art. 21. fourth paragraph)
82. Japanese Companies Act prescribes that a fee for the remuneration of the members of the
Board who are not part of the audit committee is approved by the general shareholders’ meet-
ing, a portion of which is assigned to outside directors, as well as a fee for the remuneration of
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The board of directors may appoint, among its members, excluding
the ones who also are part of the audit committee, a CEO (Shacho)
and, if necessary, a Chairman (Kaicho).83  The latter is often a founder
of the company, which, notwithstanding the fact that he retired and
that he does not possess formal powers, continues to exert significant
influence within the corporation itself.  The Company might delegate
certain decisions concerning the execution of significant transactions
to a selected director, excluding those mentioned in the fifth para-
graph of the abovementioned article (Art. 25).84
The audit committee devotes its attention to specific tasks, with the
aim of strengthening the functions of monitoring and supervising the
activities of the board. It is composed of a minimum of three mem-
bers, mostly outside directors, appointed during the shareholders’
meeting,85 according to the suggestion of the auditing company/exter-
nal auditor.
A recent analysis regarding the relationship between the presence
of independent outside directors, which corresponds to an outside di-
rector who is designated as an independent executive at the TSE, and
members of the audit committee only. See Companies Act, Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 361, http://
www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=2035&vm=04&re=02 (Japan).
83. YAHOO JAPAN CORP., supra note 81, at 4.
84. Id.
85. In the Italian context, in accordance with Article 2409-octiesdecies, CODICE CIVILE [C.C.]
[CIVIL CODE], http://www.altalex.com/documents/news/2014/12/05/societa-per-azioni (It.), the
Committee is appointed by the Board, but the statutory autonomy is allowed to provide for a
different solution. For example, “indirect” appointment allows members to choose those who
are part of the Committee, with the result that the composition of the Committee is - albeit
indirectly – an enactment of the shareholders’ meeting. See 53 GIANLUCA RIOLFO, TRATTATO DI
DIRITTO COMMERCIALE E DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO DELL’ECONOMIA: IL SISTEMA MONISTICO NELLE
SOCIETA` DI CAPITALI E COOPERATIVE [TREATISE ON BUSINESS LAW AND PUBLIC LAW OF ECON-
OMY: THE ONE-TIER SYSTEM IN THE COMPANY’S CAPITAL AND COOPERATIVE] 100 (2010) and
Vincenzo Salafia, Il sistema monistico nell’amministrazione e controllo della s.p.a. [The One-Tier
System in the Management and Control of Corporations], 12 LE SOCIETA` 1463 (2004) where the
author talks about a “substantial appointment” by the general shareholders’ meeting.
The appointing authority may, however, vary according to the bylaws, that can opt for a direct
appointment by the shareholders. In this regard, concerns are expressed both by Giorgio Oppo,
In tema di “liberta` e responsabilita`” nelle societa` di capitali riformate [On the “Freedom and
Responsibility” in the Reformed Corporations], 50 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO CIVILE 861 (2004) and by
BANCA D’ITALIA [BANK OF ITALY], DISPOSIZIONI DI VIGILANZA IN MATERIA DI ORGANIZZA-
ZIONE E GOVERNO SOCIETARIO DELLE BANCHE. RELAZIONE SULL’ANALISI D’IMPATTO [REGULA-
TORY PROVISIONS ON THE ORGANIZATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF BANKS. REPORT
ON IMPACT ANALYSIS] (Apr. 2014), https://www.bancaditalia.it/compiti/vigilanza/normativa/con-
sultazioni/2014/disp-vig-organizz-gov-societario-070214/AIR_Governance.pdf, equating, at a for-
mal level, the source of appointment of the Committee and the Board of Auditors, as well as,
introducing a communication between shareholders and directors, thus, loosening the depen-
dence between the Committee and the Board of Directors. Finally, it is evident that, whoever is
the authority that has to appoint the Committee, this aspect does not affect the powers of the
Committee.
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the return on equity (ROE) of listed companies was conducted with
the intention to, at least, indicate the possible positive effects of
outside directors on corporate performance.86  It is true – even with-
out considering relevant points, as to which the industry each com-
pany belongs or the peculiar shareholder composition – that the
appointment of outside directors and an increase in the proportion of
independent outside directors to total directors may contribute to the
increase of the ROE.87
Furthermore, a study regarding the relationship between the ratio
of independent outside directors and Tobin’s Q88 showed a possibility
that the two mentioned values are positively related.89 Moreover, if
outside directors could easily get information about the business of
their company, having outside directors positively impact corporate
performance, whereas, if companies have a high ratio of R&D or in-
tangible assets whose information is difficult to obtain by outside di-
rectors, their presence does not necessarily lead to the improvement
of corporate performance.90
Lastly, when listed companies previously did not opt for appointing
any outside directors, according to some studies, the increase in
Tobin’s Q was significant.91  A different result was obtained compar-
ing the ROA changes of listed companies that had no outside director
with that of listed companies with newly appointed outside directors: a
positive improvement of ROA derived from their appointment was
only observable after one, two, and three year increments, since the
86. See Koji Watanabe, Dokuritu Syagai Torisimariyaku no Sennin to ROE tono Kankei [Rela-
tion Between Independent Outside Directors and ROE], JUNKAN SHOˆJI HOˆMU, 2013, at 55.
87. Id. at 55-57.
88. Katsumi Takeda, Dokuritsu-Shagai Torisimariyaku Wariai to Zokusei ni Kansuru Kenkyuˆ
[Study on Proportion of Independent Outside Directors and Their Background] (Aug. 18, 2012)
(unpublished professional degree dissertation, Kobe University Graduate School of Business
Administration), http://mba.kobe-u.ac.jp/life/thesis/workingpaper/2012/wp2012-3b.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 5, 2017). Unfortunately, the study could not take into account manufacturing indus-
tries. Unfortunately, the study could not take into account manufacturing industries.
89. Id. at 10, 19-21.
90. Masashi Miya & Ryo Ogawa, Nihon kigyoˆ no torishimariyakkai koˆsei no henka o ikani
rikai suru ka?: Torishimariyakkai koˆsei no kettei yoˆin to shagai torishimariyaku no doˆnyuˆ koˆka
[How to Understand the Change in the Composition of the Boards of Directors of Japanese Com-
panies?: Decision Factors of the Composition of the Board of Directors and the Effect of Intro-
ducing Outside Directors] 6 (Research Inst. of Econ., Trade & Indus. RIETI Policy Discussion
Paper Series, Paper No. 12-P-013, 2012), http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/pdp/12p013.pdf. In
the light of the fact that some companies in the manufacturing industry have a high ratio of
R&D or intangible assets, this study and Katsumi, supra note 88, are consistent.
91. Konari Uchida, Does Corporate Board Downsizing Increase Shareholder Value?  Evidence
from Japan, 20 INT’L REV. ECON. & FIN. 562, 563 (2011) (An overview on the recent reform is
expressed by Tobin’s Q); see also Q ratio (Tobin’s Q), A DICTIONARY OF ACCOUNTING (4th ed.
2010).
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effects of a dummy variable regarding the appointment of outside di-
rectors had positive significance at the 10% level in each term.92
CONCLUDING REMARKS: COMPARING PERSPECTIVES
The companies considered above also endorsed the Code of Corpo-
rate Governance and, thus, the best practices of corporations.
First, it is clear that the role of the outside directors represents the
distinguishing feature: the most common, appreciated, and therefore,
most implemented feature.93 Their appointment is the best way to
control business, as well as to provide management with opinions and
advice.
It is also clear how the two-tier model, marked by the presence of a
supervisory board, which assumes the functions of a professional
body,94 shows neglect of the system of governance which emerged,95
even by public companies, without the presence of stable nucleus of
shareholders-entrepreneurs, to which it was initially addressed.96  In
spite of the widely held belief that Japan and Germany should belong
to the same taxonomic group in terms of corporate governance,97 the
similarities are too weak to sustain this belief.  Actually, in their oper-
ational contexts and jurisdictions, analogies among Japanese compa-
nies linked by cross-shareholdings (keiretsu)98 and the strong
correlation among German companies, insurance groups and banks,99
the attention to social policies and the tendency to secure permanent
92. Takuji Saito, Determinants of Director Board and Auditor Board Composition: Evidence
from Japan, 11 PUB. POL’Y REV. 395, 408 (2015).
93. See generally, Choong Tze Chua et al., Corporate Valuation Around the World: The Effects
of Governance, Growth, and Openness, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 35 (2007).
94. La riforma del diritto societario: Riforma organica della disciplina delle societa` di capitali
e societa` cooperative, in attuazione della legge 3 ottobre 2001, n. 366 [The Company Law Re-
form: A Comprehensive Reform of the Corporate Law Discipline, Implementing the Law Ap-
proved on October 3, 2001, n. 366], TUTTOCAMERE.IT 14 (2003), http://www.tuttocamere.it/files/
dirsoc/RDS_RELAZIONE_Cod_Civ.pdf.
95. Hideki Kanda & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Re-Examining Legal Transplants: The Director’s Fi-
duciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 887, 891 (2003).
96. 2 GIAN FRANCO CAMPOBASSO, DIRITTO COMMERCIALE: DIRITTO DELLE SOCIETA` [2 COM-
MERCIAL LAW: COMPANY LAW] 421 (9th ed. 2015).
97. Some structural similarities are analyzed in Mitsuhiro Hirata, Compliance and Govern-
ance in Large Japanese Companies, 62 MGMT. REV. BUS. ADMIN. 29, 33 (2004) (Japan), https://
www.toyo.ac.jp/uploaded/attachment/2875.pdf.
98. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps
Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871 (1993).
99. Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Myth of the Main Bank: Japan and Comparative
Corporate Governance, 27 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 401 (2002).
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work100 represent too weak elements, if compared to the intricacies of
the two corporate governance models.101  The abolition of Yugen
Gaisha, as well as the erosion of the Japanese banking model102 led
Japanese corporate governance to differentiate from the Teutonic
model, from it was initially inspired.103  Even in refraining from specif-
ically standardized issues, such as the appointment of auditors elected
by the workers,104 Japan proved to prefer a different evolution,105
100. See “human centrism,” a theory defined by Hiroyuki Itami, in HIROO TAKAHASHI, THE
CHALLENGE FOR JAPANESE MULTINATIONALS: STRATEGIC ISSUES FOR GLOBAL MANAGEMENT
64-65 (2013).
101. See generally Ronald Dore, Deviant or Different? Corporate Governance in Japan and
Germany, 13 CORP. GOVERNANCE INT’L REV. 437 (2005).
102. On one hand, according to some scholars, the main features of the Japanese governance
environment include, “(1) the main banking system, in which banks voluntarily restructure loans
to some distressed borrowers, (2) a social distaste for hostile takeovers, (3) implicit promises of
employment stability, and (4) belief systems about the proper role and structure of the board of
directors.” Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in
Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2083 (2001) (for a wider analysis
of Japanese governance’s structures, see Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Who Appoints
Them, What Do They Do? Evidence on Outside Directors from Japan, 14 J. ECON. MGMT.
STRATEGY 299 (2005); Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note 99; T. E. Cooke & Etsuo Sawa, Corporate
Governance Structure in Japan – Form and Reality, 6 CORP. GOVERNANCE INT’L REV. 217
(1998); MASAHIKO AOKI ET AL., THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTORY
OVERVIEW (1993); Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, supra note 98; Stephen D. Prowse, The
Structure of Corporate Ownership in Japan, 47 J. FINANCE 1121 (1992); Takeo Hoshi et al., Cor-
porate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups, 106 Q.J.
ECON. 33 (1991); Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1 (1990); Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and Corporate Monitoring and Con-
trol in Japan, 11 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG. 399 (1989)). On the other hand, it must be recognized
that Japanese governance focuses on commitment and stability while the U.S. one focuses on
mechanisms of adaptive efficiency.
103. See DAVID F. LARCKER & BRIAN TAYAN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MATTERS: A
CLOSER LOOK AT ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 41 & 52 n.51 (2nd ed.
2016); Seki & Clarke, supra note 5, at 739–743, 743 n.74 (citing Randall Morck & Bernard
Yeung, Japanese Economic Success and the Curious Characteristics of Japanese Stock Prices
(Hitotsubashi Univ. Inst. of Econ. Research Ctr. For Econ. Insts. Working Paper Series, Paper
No. 2001-19, 2001)); Marco Giorgi, Dal Giappone l’epitaffio del sistema dualistico [From Japan,
the Epitaph of the Two-Tier Model], FIN. COMMUNITY HUB (Mar. 13, 2015), http://fchub.it/ar-
ticoli-fchub/dal-giappone-l-epitaffio-del-sistema-dualistico (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
104. The topic, also following the progress of the reform and the simultaneous evolution of
factual events, did not lead to the realization of the desired co-determination, a theory of Ger-
man origin, in the Japanese system. See Goto, supra note 16, at 30; see generally Ryuichi
Yamakawa, Labor Law Reform in Japan: A Response to Recent Socio-Economic Changes, 49
AM. J. COMP. L. 627 (2001). See also MARCO BIASI, IL NODO DELLA PARTECIPAZIONE DEI
LAVORATORI IN ITALIA: EVOLUZIONE E PROSPETTIVE NEL CONFRONTO CON IL MODELLO TED-
ESCO ED EUROPEO [THE KNOT WORKERS’ PARTICIPATION IN ITALY: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS
COMPARING THE GERMAN AND EUROPEAN MODELS] (2013) (illustrating a German perspective
on co-determination).
105. Considering the “change” or the “continuity” within the context, it is worth to recall that
“Change” suggests evolution to something identifiable; “continuity” suggests adhering
to an existing state of affairs. Although notionally opposites, “change” and “continuity”
have something in common — they both suggest some form of predictability and coher-
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striving to follow the intentions of markets and institutional inves-
tors:106 a clear evolution towards United States models,107 that shows
an opposite view on the adoption of the two-tier models, of which
there is now clear regression.108
The discipline exposed so far can only lead to a further comparison
to what happens in the Italian corporate system, although national
context109 and geographical area will need to be taken into account.110
ence in regulatory reform. . . . Japanese corporate governance reform or, indeed, law
reform more generally in Japan, is context-specific, multi-layered (with different dimen-
sions not necessarily pulling all in the same direction – for example, in relations with
key outside suppliers), and therefore more random or “chaotic.”
Nottage & Wolff, supra note 70, at iv.
106. The consideration about the role of foreign shareholders is highlighted in TAKAHASHI,
supra note 100, at 65 and Geoffrey Owen, When US Investors Took on Japan’s Executives:
“Hedge Fund Activism in Japan” Tells the Story of an Extraordinary Battle Between Steel Part-
ners and Bull-Dog Sauce, FIN. TIMES (June 27, 2012) (book review), https://www.ft.com/content/
871df304-bed0-11e1-8ccd-00144feabdc0. The consideration has a clear reflection, in the Italian
context, as reflected in the speeches of Sergio Erede, Founder and Senior Partner, Studio Legale
Bonelli Erede, Una nuova prospettiva per il sistema monistico [A New Perspective for the One-
Tier System] at the European House Ambrosetti L’Osservatorio sull’Eccellenza dei Sistemi di
Governo in Italia - Workshop: Le aree di frontiera della Corporate Governance (Nov. 17, 2015)
and Stefano Preda, Full Professors of Financial Law, Polytechnic University of Milan, Scelte di
investimento, modelli di gestione e controllo e qualita` del sistema di governo: il punto di vista
degli investitori e delle istituzioni [Investment Decisions, Management and Control Models and
Quality of Corporate Governance Systems: The Point of View of Investors and Institutions] at
the European House Ambrosetti - L’Osservatorio sull’Eccellenza dei Sistemi di Governo in Ita-
lia - Workshop: Le aree di frontiera della Corporate Governance (Nov. 17, 2015)
107. Masao Nakamura, Japanese Corporate Governance Practices in the Post-Bubble Era: Im-
plications of Institutional and Legal Reforms in the 1990s and Early 2000s, 3 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE
& GOVERNANCE 233, 254 (2006). In May 2003, for example, Toyota reduced the number of
directors from 58 to 27. However, it did not intend to fully embrace a U.S. model of corporate
governance since because “shareholders are important, but what comes first are the employees
who work here and the people who obtain the patents are the employees.” TAKAHASHI, supra
note 100, at 65-66 (quoting Chairman Mitarai of Canon). The idea of the “best adaptation to the
specific operational needs of the social enterprise” is also confirmed in CAMPOBASSO, supra note
96, at 354, where reference is expressly made also to the Code of Corporate Governance. See
also Leaders, Corporate Governance in Japan: Olympian Depths, ECONOMIST (Nov. 3, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21565626-want-invest-underperforming-companies-no-
outside-directors-go-japan-olympian; Sanford M. Jacoby, Foreign Investors and Corporate Gov-
ernance in Japan, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND MANAGERIAL REFORM IN JAPAN 93 (D.
Hugh Whittaker & Simon Deakin eds. 2009).
108. See DEUTSCHE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE KODEX [DCGK] [GERMAN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE CODE], as amended, art. 3, translation at http://www.dcgk.de//files/dcgk/usercon-
tent/en/download/code/2015-05-05_Corporate_Governance_Code_EN.pdf; Portale, supra note 1
(discussing a case of the Portuguese bank Millennium bcp).
109. One commentator described harmonization of governance systems as follows:
[G]overnance systems cannot be completely standardized because their design depends
on the setting. For example, governance systems differ depending on whether you take
a shareholder perspective or a stakeholder perspective of the firm, as well as the effi-
ciency of local capital markets, quality of the legal system, and labor markets. They also
differ depending on your view of the prevalence of self-interest among executives.
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The direction towards which the entire Japanese company law has
moved, and is still moving, follows the same direction according to
which the Italian legislator moved, both in the predominance of the
traditional model and in the recent attention to the one-tier sys-
tems,111 which is the most unexpected amongst the amendments of
management of corporations.112
The Japanese Stock Companies customarily adopt the traditional
model due to the fact that Japan’s corporate governance is identified
. . . .
The extent to which you believe this is the norm in society will have a direct impact on
the extent to which you believe control mechanisms should be in place to prevent the
occurrence of self-interested behavior and the rigor of those controls. Nevertheless, in
the end, a balance must be struck. . . . .
. . . [C]ontext is critical to design an effective corporate governance system.
LARCKER & TAYAN, supra note 103, at 417–18.
110. As shown by the analysis conducted with respect to Singapore, China, and Japan by Hui
Yun Corinne Tan, The One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Structures and Hybrids in Asia - Conver-
gence and What Really Matters for Corporate Governance, SSRN 3-5 (Sept. 1, 2011), http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/abstract=2140345 (last visited Feb. 5, 2017) and Robert Mcgee, Corporate
Governance in Asia: An Eight-Country Comparative Study, 5 CORP. OWNERSHIP & CONTROL
186 (2008).
111. See some suggestions proposed in COMMISSIONE NAZIONALE PER LE SOCIETA` E LA
BORSA [CONSOB] [IT. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N], MODIFICHE AL REGOLAMENTO N. 11971 IN
MATERIA DI EMITTENTI E AL REGOLAMENTO N. 16191 IN MATERIA DI MERCATI: PRIMI ESITI
DEGLI APPROFONDIMENTI CONDOTTI NELL’AMBITO DEI TAVOLI DI LAVORO “CONCORRENZA
FRA SISTEMI DI REGOLE E VIGILANZA” E “SEMPLIFICAZIONE REGOLAMENTARE DEL MERCATO
FINANZIARIO ITALIANO” (DOCUMENTO DI CONSULTAZIONE) [MODIFICATIONS TO REGULATION
N. 11971 ON ISSUERS AND REGULATION N. 16191 ON MARKETS: FIRST RESULTS OF THE STUDIES
CONDUCTED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ROUNDTABLES REGARDING “COMPETITION BETWEEN
SYSTEMS OF RULES AND SUPERVISION” AND “SIMPLIFICATION OF REGULATIONS IN THE ITALIAN




0725.pdf&usg=AFQjCNGhUpMpyZKeBnEDzzgtyomizUY4mQ (last visited Feb. 5, 2017)
where provisions dedicated to alternative systems of governance, and in particular to the one-
tier one, emerge for the constant reference to the traditional system in their drafting. The lack of
an independent regulatory framework, combined with the difficulty of adapting institutions for-
mulated for the traditional system to alternative models, might be one of the factors undermin-
ing the adoption of the latter among listed companies. Therefore, it was proposed to create an
autonomous body of norms, in order to ensure certainty in the application of such models, pro-
posing a proper set of rules for them through a rewriting of both articles contained in the Italian
Civil Code and Consolidated Law on Finance.
112. Chiara Mosca, I principıˆ di funzionamento del modello monistico. I poteri del comitato di
controllo [The Operating Principles of One-Tier Model. The Powers of the Audit Committee], in
PIETRO ABBADESSA ET AL., IL NUOVO NUOVO DIRITTO DIRITTO DELLE SOCIETA`: LIBER
AMICORUM GIAN FRANCO CAMPOBASSO [THE NEW COMPANY LAW: LIBER AMICORUM GIAN
FRANCO CAMPOBASSO] 736 (Pietro Abbadessa ed. 2006). Such wonder is, however, mitigated in
the practice, now consolidated in the sense of importing solutions or guidelines from the Anglo-
American experience, id. at 737 & n.8, whose functioning is developed in Melvin Aron Eisen-
berg, An Overview of the Principles of Corporate Governance, 48 BUS. LAW. 1271 (1993).
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as “stakeholder” one, with bank finance and monitoring, the absence
of hostile takeovers, moderate executive pay, management cultures
based on consensus, emphasis on product quality and long-term strat-
egy rather than financial returns, and so on. “Patient” owners and
long-term management was thought to be supportive of long-term em-
ployment, since short-term returns are sacrificed to build stable
relationships.113
In the Italian context, despite the fact that the doctrine revealed
keen interest in these issues, the non-traditional models did not meet
the favor of listed companies: only three of them currently adopt the
two-tier structure (UBI Banca, Popolare of Milano and SS Lazio),
only three of them currently opt for the one-tier structure (CHL Engi-
neering and Intesa Sanpaolo, that recently moved to this model114);115
five of them preferred to go back to the traditional system, once they
accomplished the two-tier experience (Mediobanca, Banco Popolare,
A2A, Management & Capitali and Mid Industry Capital); only a few of
them (as Ducati Motor Holding and Buongiorno) were delisted.116
The success of one-tier models resonated more in in Japan117 than
in Italy,118 thanks to the greater flexibility of the legislation, not pro-
113. Jackson, supra note 6, at 17.
114. Piergaetano Marchetti, Tanto tuono` che piovve. Intesa Sanpaolo e il monistico [The Rain
Thundered Down so heavily that It Finally Rained. Intesa Sanpaolo and the One-Tier model], 1
Analisi Giuridica dell’Economia 9 (2016).
115. Despite its Anglo-Saxon origins, Calkoen, supra note 7, at 46–48, the Italian connota-
tions of the document are evident, as shown in Salvatore Providenti, Il sistema monistico di
amministrazione e controllo [The One-Tier System of Management and Control], in LE SOCIETA`
COMMERCIALI: ORGANIZZAZIONE, RESPONSABILITA` E CONTROLLI [CORPORATIONS: ORGANIZA-
TION, RESPONSIBILITIES AND CONTROL] 420, n.5 (Michele Vietti ed., 2014). See also Laura Schi-
uma, Il sistema monistico: il consiglio di amministrazione ed il comitato per il controllo sulla
gestione [The One-Tier System: The Board of Directors and the Audit Committee], in LA GOV-
ERNANCE NELLE SOCIETA` DI CAPITALI. A DIECI ANNI DALLA RIFORMA [GOVERNANCE IN CORPO-
RATIONS. TEN YEARS AFTER THE REFORM] 465 (Piergaetano Marchetti & Daniele U.
Santosuosso eds., 2013); CARLO ANGELICI, LA RIFORMA DELLE SOCIETA` DI CAPITALI. LEZIONI
DI DIRITTO COMMERCIALE [THE REFORM OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: BUSINESS LAW
CLASSES] 156 (2nd ed. 2006).
116. See Companies Delisted from January 1995 to 30 April 2015, BORSA ITALIANA, http://
www.borsaitaliana.it/borsaitaliana/ufficio-stampa/dati-storici/revocheapr.en.pdf (last visited Feb.
7, 2017).
117. See generally TOMMASO DI MARCELLO, SISTEMA MONISTICO E AUTONOMIA ORGANIZZA-
TIVA [ONE-TIER SYSTEM AND AUTONOMY IN ORGANIZATION] (2012); Vincenzo Calandra
Buonaura, I modelli di amministrazione e controllo nella riforma del diritto societario [Manage-
ment and Control Models in the Company Law Reform], 30 GIURISPRUDENZA COMMER. 535, 556
(2003).
118. Francesco Vella, Sistemi alternativi del governo societario: ci vuole un incentivo [Alterna-
tive Systems of Corporate Governance: Incentives Needed], LAVOCE.INFO (2015), http://www
.lavoce.info/archives/37176/sistemi-alternativi-del-governo-societario-ci-vuole-un-incentivo (last
visited Feb. 5, 2017). Standards are almost exclusively aimed at listed companies, not only be-
cause they are the major candidates to exploit the potential of the one-tier boards, but also for
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viding rigid mechanisms of list voting,119 but rather pluralism and di-
versity in the composition of the board.
Adopting minor models, whose details are not generally known,
does not correspond, however, to a recognition of their superiority, or
of the obsolescence of traditional ones. In fact, in absence of a clear
superiority of one of model, it is empirically120 preferable to move
from the substantial functional equivalence,121  to the effectiveness of
all models.122
Is there an increasing convergence “llamada a dulcificar y relativizar
el debate sobre la contraposicio´n de sistemas de administracio´n?”123
[“Call to soften and relativize the debate on the comparison among
models of corporate governance”]
the presence of self-regulation that can render any application easier. There is, of course, no
certainty about the effects of this experiment, but the regulator must have the courage to em-
bark on new paths to evolve.
119. The 28.6% of respondents to a survey on governance mechanisms would welcome a
change in the current governance system and three-quarters of them emphasize that this change
would only be relevant for widely held companies with shareholders not concentrated. More
generally, with regard to boards of directors, see Guido Ferrarini et al., Corporate Boards in
Italy, in CORPORATE BOARDS IN LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN EUROPE
367 (Paul Davies et al. eds., 2013), as well as the empirical analysis, at national level, presented in
the report, MATTEO EREDE & FEDERICO GHEZZI, LA COMPOSIZIONE DEL CONSIGLIO DI AM-
MINISTRAZIONE NELLE SOCIETA` QUOTATE [THE COMPOSITION OF BOARDS OF DIRECTORS IN
LISTED COMPANIES] (2015), at the meeting of Rivista delle Societa`, held in Venice on November
13 – 14, 2015.
120. The functional equivalence of the models is not undisputed, as proved by the different
opinions shown with regard to the “Banca Intesa experiment.” See Salvatore Bragantini, Dal
duale al monistico: nell’interesse di chi? [From Two-Tier to One-Tier Boards: in Whose Interests?]
LAVOCE.INFO (2015), http://www.lavoce.info/archives/38167/dal-duale-al-monistico-nellinteresse-
di-chi/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2017).
121. The true meaning of the concepts is detailed in Mosca, supra note 112.
122. Mario Libertini, Scelte fondamentali di politica legislativa e indicazioni di principio nella
riforma del diritto societario del 2003. Appunti per un corso di diritto commerciale [Fundamental
Choices of Legislative Policy and Gudelines in the 2003 Reform of Company Law. Notes for a
Course in Business Law], 3 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO SOCIETARIO 198 (2008). These considerations –
as observed in Portale, supra note 1 – are markedly related to the theories already stated in
Paolo Ferro-Luzzi, Riflessioni in tema di controllo [Reflections on Corporate Control], in LUIGI
ARTURO BIANCHI ET AL., DIRITTO, MERCATO ED ETICA. DOPO LA CRISI. OMAGGIO A PIER-
GAETANO MARCHETTI [LAW, MARKET AND ETHICS. AFTER THE CRISIS. TRIBUTE TO PIER-
GAETANO MARCHETTI] 309 (2010).
123. The expression was originally formulated in Gaudencio Esteban Velasco, Administracio´n
y control. Disposiciones comunes a ambos sistemas de administracio´n y control (I) [Management
and Control. Provisions Common to Both Management and Control Systems (I)], in LUIS FER-
NA´NDEZ DEL POZO & GAUDENCIO ESTEBAN VELASCO, LA SOCIEDAD ANO´NIMA EUROPEA :
R. . .GIMEN JURI´DICO SOCIETARIO, LABORAL Y FISCAL [EUROPEAN PUBLIC LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY: CORPORATE, LABOR AND TAX LAW] 637 (2004) (Spain).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPB\15-1\DPB102.txt unknown Seq: 28  1-MAY-17 15:21
52 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:25
Is there “a virtuous competition among governance systems or a
Babel where anything is possible?”124
This awkward question, already addressed at the end of a Sympo-
sium on two-tier models, is still leading, also with respect to one-tier
ones.125  Well, in such (uncertain) context, the flexible and efficient
one-tier model126 might127 turn out to be successful, because it
achieves a balance within the Board that, on the one hand, guarantees
a streamlined decision-making process for those who are in charge of
this task, and, on the other hand, is open to inspection and supervi-
sion.128  The newly introduced model could turn out to be successful,
even in a strengthened way, since it represents a practical response to
the intentions of the legislator to create a common corporate regula-
tion,129 a major step towards a standardization, or at least a strong
coordination, of national plans, where executive and non-executive di-
rectors promote a vigorous debate on - a synergy,130 if not an osmo-
124. Piergaetano Marchetti, Sistema dualistico [The Two-Tier System] at the Meeting I sistemi
alternativi di amministrazione e controllo. Un primo bilancio. [Alternative Management and
Control Systems. An Initial Assessment] (Mar. 2008).
125. Marchetti, supra note 25.
126. Erede, supra note 106. The author, starting from the fact that there are no overlaps and
duplications between the tasks of the Board of Directors, Audit and Risk Committee, Executive
Director responsible for overseeing internal control, the Board of Auditors, Body supervision
pursuant to Law 231/2001, and Independent Auditors, in tasks such as the evaluation of the
adequacy of the organizational and internal control system and risk management or fairness in
the use of accounting principles for annual financial statements and request checks to internal
audit, believes it can be a viable alternative for corporate governance. These considerations,
empirically proved, Preda, supra note 106, can offer new insights, in favor of a model that repre-
sents a leverage to simplify corporate governance and attract foreign institutional investors.
127. A global judgment, though not unconditionally positive, is expressed by Mosca, supra
note 112 at 762 and Bragantini, supra note 120.
128. However, problematic issues are analyzed, in an extremely critical way, Bragantini, supra
note 120, even if leaving to the market a valuation on the results to which the “Banca Intesa
experiment” will conduce. Internationally, a discussion of the legal-empirical results to which
alternative models led is exposed in Carsten Jungmann, The Effectiveness of Corporate Govern-
ance in One-Tier and Two-Tier Board Systems: Evidence from the UK and Germany, 3 EUR.
COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 426 (2006).
129. See Marco Ventoruzzo, Experiments in Comparative Corporate Law: The Recent Italian
Reform and the Dubious Virtues of a Market for Rules in the Absence of Effective Regulatory
Competition, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 113, 118 (2004).
130. Paolo Montalenti, Amministrazione e controllo nella societa` per azioni: riflessioni sistema-
tiche e proposte di riforma [Management and Control in Corporations: Systematic Reflections and
Reform Proposals ], 58 RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETA` 42, 75 (2013).
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sis131 - of a quasi-two-tier model within the one-tier board of
directors.132
131. Niccolo` Abriani, Verso una riforma della disciplina sui controlli interni [Towards a Re-
form of the Internal Controls Rules ], in ATTI DEI SEMINARI CELEBRATIVI PER I 40 ANNI
DALL’ISTITUZIONE DELLA COMMISSIONE NAZIONALE PER LE SOCIETA` E LA BORSA
[CELEBRATORY SEMINARS FOR THE 40 YEARS FROM THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR COMPANIES AND THE STOCK EXCHANGE] 97 (G. Mollo ed. 2015), http://www
.consob.it/documents/11973/201676/qg9.pdf/89cb69a2-8e15-40c7-8fc6-168eeb012a5b.
132. See generally Peter Bo¨ckli, Konvergenz: Anna¨herung des monistischen und des dualistis-
chen Fu¨hrungs- und Aufsichtssystems [Convergence: Convergence of the Monistic and Dualistic
Leadership and Supervisory Systems], in HANDBUCH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LEITUNG UND
U¨BERWACHUNG BO¨RSENNOTIERTER UNTERNEHMEN IN DER RECHTS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSPRAXIS
[MANUAL ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF LISTED COMPA-
NIES IN THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRACTICE] (Peter Hommelhoff et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2009).
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